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1 INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of 1990, distinct demands for
democratization began to be made on African countries
as a new condition for aid by both the multilateral
financial institutions, mainly the World Bank and the
IMF, and the major Western countries, especially the
USA and the UK. In order to understand the historical
significance of the new political conditionalities of aid
for Africa one needs to locate them within the context
of (a) the emerging, apparently-unipolar world; and
(b) the nature of African states, making a distinction
between the interests of these states and civil society
therein. This is because historical events do not mean
the same thing for different societies, nor do they mean
the same thing for different classes and social groups
even within the same society, state or nation.
We propose to look at this question in the following
manner. We shall first look at the different points of
view of the 'donors' (finance capital), the African states
and official organizations, and, finally, independent
perspectives of African civil society. We then conclude
with what should be done and suggestions as to who can
do it.
1.1 Five propositions on the new political
conditlonalities
The first proposition is that the new political
conditionalities have nothing to do with the desire of
Western countries to actually encourage democracy in
Africa. For a long time, Western countries supported
dictatorship, for instance in Zaire, Liberia, Uganda and
Kenya. France distinguished itself in supporting
dictators with open military interventions on their
behalf against popular opposition. With the collapse of
Soviet-led state socialism, Western countries can no
longer justify their support for dictators who have
hitherto been called 'bulwarks against communism'.
I For the last point see African Recovery, April-June 1990, Vol 4 No I:
15, 17.
2 These views are exemplified for instance by the ideas put forward at
the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance. See
Prime Minister's Office, Common Responsibility in the 1990o.
Stockholm, 1991. One author has characterized the on-going process
as globalization and the attempt by Western states to create a global
state and effectively dissolve Third World states using such
instruments as the multilateral financial institutions (in particular the
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The new conditionalities in the emerging unipolar
world therefore are designed to serve, in the new
situation, three purposes: (a) to crush once and for all
the ideology of socialism and to replace it
unambiguously with the ideology of free enterprise
worldwide; (b) to create a new credible source of
legitimacy for hegemony and thereby ensure leverage
over specific countries which are considered
economically and politically useful to the West or
specific Western countries; and (c) to justify 'the
impending decline in Africa's share of global assistance
as resource flows to Eastern Europe begin to mount'.'
The second proposition is that the new political
conditionalities should be seen as part and parcel of a
wider global scheme by the West under various forms,
fora, organizations and guises to create a new economic
and military world order following the collapse of state
socialism and the end of the Cold War, using a populist
ideology of democracy. The wider scheme is
constituted by the Western governments, multilateral
finance capital (mainly the World Bank and the IMF),
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), environ-
mentalists and several emergent organizations in the
West or old ones which may be put to good use in the
new world order in-the-making.2
The third contention of this article is that, in any event,
the simultaneous application of (a) economic
conditionalities by the IMF and the World Bank in the
form of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)
with (b) the new stipulated political conditionalities is
necessarily contradictory and cannot successfully be
accomplished together. SAPs are necessarily con-
tradictory to the development and sustenance of
democratic government and the free operation of civil
society and autonomous civil organizations. This is
World Bank), NGO5 and the environmentalists, the latter two
seeking to replace the state at the grassroots level and to arrest and
control the development of the underdeveloped countries
respectively. See F. W. Jjuuko, 'The State, Democracy and
Constitutionalism in Africa'. A paper presented at the Conference
entitled, The ConotitutionaiProtection ofRights: United States/Africa
Dialogues. Faculty of Law, Makerere University/Centre for Human
Rights, Columbia University. Held at Makerere University,
Kampala 13-15 August 1991.
ids bulletin, vol 24, no 1, 1993
because SAP 'completely undermines Africa's
sovereignty, creates and/or further strengthens
authoritarian regimes who will have to implement
inherently anti-democratic set of socio-economic
reforms entailed in the programme'.3
The fourth contention is that the limitation of the
definition of democracy to mere political pluralism,
namely equating democracy with multi-party politics,
amounts to the return of Africa to square one, that is,
the first few post-independence years. The definition
of democracy by (multilateral and bilateral) finance
capital today leads once again to the creation and/or
consolidation of the winner-takes-all situations which
discredited and delegitimized the immediate post-
colonial forms of pluralism. But what was wrong with
the political reforms that preceded independence and
continued for a while thereafter? As M. Mamdani
recently put it:
though pluralist in its claim, the reform presented
pluralism only in its political aspect, while it
equated political pluralism with multi-partyism. It
was a deft movement which served both to
emancipate and to stifle; it undermined social and
ideological pluralism. Its realization led to the
flowering of political parties, but the wilting of
social movements and the popular press. It is in this
contradictory context that nationalist parties with a
transformative social agenda were recast, usually
from within, into no more than craft unions of
professional politicians, their objective restricted to
enhancing their political careers.4
Indeed it must be added that the political
conditionalities variously referred to as 'better
governance', 'political reform', or simply 'democracy'
do not really seriously refer to the popular participation
of civil society in the decision-making process of the
state and the political economy. Even reference to the
observance of human rights is still in the narrow sense
of rights of the individual and his/her protection from
arbitrary or illegal state action against such individual.
The concept of rights under the framework of the new
political conditionalities does not take into account the
changed situation in Africa 30 years after independence.
Group and social rights are not articulated. And
precisely because a multi-party system is a winner-
takes-all system and because it would depend upon the
external aid being dangled as a bait, the winners
become beholden to the 'donor' and must try and be
good boys (and/or girls, if any). They therefore become
even more compradorial and concerned about their
partisan local supporters and the foreign donors and
not the whole of society. Such a result would do little to
advance the cause of human rights, individual or group.
''Editorial', Codeeria Bulletin, No 2, 1990.
'M. Mamdani, 1992, 'Africa: Democratic Theory and Democratic
Struggles'. Paper presented at the Annual General Meeting of
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Finally, and probably most important, the very idea
that people can be forced to be democratic and/or free
is quite startling Freedom and liberation from
autocratic rule as well as democracy and accountability
cannot be decreed. They must have a social basis in
which they arise, are nurtured and sustained. If the
western financial institutions and 'donors' genuinely
wished to assist the development of democracy in
Africa then this would be done from the perspective of
the majority, of civil society and the participation of the
latter in the formulation of the democratic programme
and not by decreeing from afar what constitutes
democracy.
There is no doubt therefore that the project of the new
political conditionalities is none other than an attempt
by the big western capitalist powers to create a new
legitimacy in a new post-Cold War world order
whereby discredited dictatorial/authoritarian regimes
in Africa or elsewhere in the Third World are replaced
by new leaders under the ideology of pluralism,
democracy and free enterprise (the market system)
while maintaining hegemony over countries which are
economically and politically useful to those western
powers.
2 CONTRADICTORY PERSPECTIVES ON THE
NEW POLITICAL CONDITIONALITIES
Having outlined our own views on the new political
conditionalities, it is imperative that we lay bare the
different perspectives taken by three interested parties:
(a) the donors (finance capital) and their intellectual
ideologues; (b) African regimes and official African
institutions such as the OAU (Organization of African
Unity) and ECA (UN Economic Commission for
Africa); and (c) the people themselves seen as
constituting civil society - especially as represented by
radical organizations and intellectual opinion.
2.1 The donors' view
One must begin from the premise that most African
governments have been undemocratic, whether they
proclaimed themselves socialist or capitalist. However,
the definition of what constitutes democracy is not
agreed amongst the three parties mentioned above.
Although lip-service may be paid by all to certain
requirements for democracy, especially the question of
popular participation and the involvement of
women, distinct perspectives may be identified. The
donors' view first.
First of all the 'donors' - or finance capital, to put it in
less euphemistic terms - view and present their role as
CODESRIA, Dakar, 10-14 February, also available at CER (Centre
for Basic Research, Kampala) mimeo: 7-8.
crucial in the struggle for democracy in Africa. One
observer put it this way:
It is now clear that the main cause of the wave of
political change sweeping Africa is not the
aspirations of African intellectuals, much as they
long for liberty; nor is it a union of the political
opposition and the masses, which has been
conspicuous by its absence with fitful exceptions in
Zambia, Kenya and Zaire . . . No. The principal
cause of Africa's wind of change is the World Bank
and the donor countries. They are explicitly
demanding political change as a condition for
further loans to Africa.5
This perspective views African civil society as too weak
to struggle for and achieve democracy. But to
understand the perspective of finance capital one needs
to uncover actual behaviour of Western states
representing this capital prior to the end of the Cold
War and to a large extent even today. France 'actively
aided the suppression of the dissident movements in all
French-speaking countries and provided intelligence
on the exiled opposition to African secret police
services. The United States created Mobutu Sese Seko
in Zaire and tolerated Samuel Doe in Liberia. Britain
favoured Daniel arap Moi in Kenya.'6 Despite protests
by Africans generally, some specific opposition parties
and groups in civil society, the West supported
repressive regimes and opportunistically described
them as 'moderates'. And while in 1990-91 the main
donor governments were declaring that they would
give more aid money to governments which respected
human rights and exhibited better and accountable
governance, the USA continued to 'shore up President
Mobuto in Zaire' while the British government
continued to give more aid to Kenya than any other
African government.7 As one explanation goes:
the selectivity with which these new criteria are
being applied suggests that an insistence on good
governance could be used as an excuse to abandon
those African countries considered basket cases
while maintaining leverage over the more interesting
ones, with less regard to the standards they adopt.8
It was right from the beginning of 1990 that political
conditionalities began to be made. World Bank
President Barber Conable, at a meeting of the Bretton
Woods Committee in Washington in April 1990,
advanced 'better governance' as the first requirement
in initiating African recovery and hinted that donors








would increasingly link aid to this question.9 At the
same conference, the US Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, more bluntly
stated that governments not responding to democratic
change would be at a disadvantage in obtaining external
assistance. He further stated that 'it was likely that
democratization would become the third conditionality
for US assistance after World Bank/IMF approval of
economic policies and US assessment of a country's
human rights record'.'° This message has subsequently
been emphasized in many places. In May 1990 John
Major, then UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, had
warned at the IMF/World Bank meetings in
Washington that 'in a situation where aid resources are
limited, donors would place strict conditions on
spending, including moves towards better government'.
Governments had to 'become more accountable to
their peoples before rich nations could justify further
aid'." And in a keynote speech in June 1990, at an
international Conference in London organized under
the auspices of the UN Africa Recovery Programme,
UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd categorically
linked aid to democracy. 'The principle of
conditionality', he stated 'has been clearly laid down by
the British Government, by the European Community
and by the USA'.'2
The explanation given by donors is that they are using
economic leverage to enhance accountability of African
regimes to their peoples and to ensure that repressed
popular energies and misappropriated aid monies are
both released for development. Openly putting it in
ideological terms, while justifying the new political
conditionalities, Douglas Hurd argued that 'free
markets, open trade and private property are the best
way known to mankind for improving its standards of
living."3 It should also be pointed out that the new
political conditionalities are supported by some right
wing African or Africanist scholars such as Professor
All Mazrui.'4 However what clearly unmasks the ideological
character of the new conditionalities is the attitude of
the Western countries to the democratic experiment in
Algeria. The Islamic Front had democratically won the
Algerian local elections of June 1990 and went ahead to
win the first round of parliamentary elections of
December 1991. But because the West could not
tolerate a democracy where the Islamic party would
have won democratically, it has since the subversion of
that democratic experiment by a coup supported the
coupmakers.
'2Africa Recovery, july-September 1990, Vol 4 No 2: 29
''ibid.
O Professor All Mazrui for instance as early as November 1990 at the
CODESRIA Conference on Academic Freedom in Kampala 26-29
November 1990 supported the conditionalities and saw them as the
way forward.
"SeeAfr,caßvents, Vol 8 No 2, February 1992:7-8 and A. El-Affendi,
Who's Afraid of Islam?: 32-35.
2.2 The views of African governments
The second perspective on the new political
conditionalities is that of the African regimes generally
and other official African institutions such as the OAU
and the UN Economic Commission for Africa. This
category may be divided into two groups: those who
favour democracy but argue that it must not be
imposed; and those who are opposed outright to
democracy although they pay lip-service to the
concept. Those who are opposed to democracy and
accountability are mainly constituted by the ruling
regimes although many have now been forced to accept
the multiparty definition of democracy by a
combination of the political conditionalites for aid as
well as internal resistance, especially where this has
been strong as in Zambia, Kenya and Mali)6 At heart
they have not accepted the new multiparty systems and
would do anything to subvert them. In a BBC interview
President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya accepted that he
had been forced to accept the multiparty definition of
democracy by Western finance capital (the donors). He
stated succinctly:
You are not allowed to think, but you are told: do
what we want you to do. If I make a suggestion,
which I know is good for my people, and they say
no, you must follow this, you must accept what has
been decided all over the world, that is not going to
help my people. The donors, it is a pity that they tell
us: do this, you must accept it. It is not something
that comes from your heart.!7
On the other hand, many of the 'new-breed' leaders
believe that the conditionalities are necessary. After all,
it is these conditionalities which shored up their
resistance and led to the moves by incumbent regimes
from the one-party to the multi party system. But in
essence the definition of democracy by the 'new breed'
is as narrow as that of the immediate post-
independence era where the majority in civil society
were being systematically excluded following 'the
struggle for independence' in which mass support had
been crucial. In some cases, such as Ivory Coast and
Gabon, the long-serving Presidents have been able to
continue in power. Indeed 'in many countries the
creation of new parties has not directly involved many
citizens from outside the existing political elite, and
particularly not in the rural areas'.'8 But more
interesting is the fact that, even in countries where
incumbent leaders have been ousted, as in Benin:
the new power-holders come, by and large, from the
same political class and even the same families as
those who were close to the centre of power in the
previous three decades. In country after country,
the new opposition leaders or the victorious
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democratic politicians are often none other than
people who served the single party long and
faithfully without any great signs of a crisis of
conscience. Some of the successful new-breed
politicians are simply old-breed politicians who
chose the right moment to break with the past and
engage in the new watch-words of good governance
and respect for human rights)9
This characterization of the changes applies to most of
Africa.
Further, although the new breed politicians generally
have legitimacy, such as the MMD of Zambia, or
FORD of Kenya (still in waiting) or the Sacred Union
of Zaire (still outmanoeuvered by Mobutu Sese Seko)
they have weak links with civil society: workers, the
informal sector, women and peasants. Indeed any links
that may now exist are very tenuous or merely
temporary due to the common enemy in the existing
political status quo.
The alternative variant of the view of African
governments, held by some African leaders and also,
notably, the OAU Secretariat and the Economic
Commission for Africa (ECA), is that, while democracy
must be supported, its definition must be left to the
Africans. The OAU Secretary General, Salim Ahmed
Saum, argued that democracy must involve
fundamental freedoms of expression, association and
political choice and the ability of all citizens to
participate in the process of national governance,
thereby allowing/enabling people to exercise their
talents and responsibilities. Democracy is not a
revelation, but must be expressed, concretely and
necessarily in different ways from society to society.2° A
similar view has been emphasized again and again by
President Museveni of Uganda.
Further the OAU Secretary-General argues in these
terms:
more misleading is the emerging notion that
multipartism, in a magical way, can bring about
development. For no matter how many political
parties an African state may have, that will not alter
her economic fortunes. It will not change the price
of coffee, cocoa, cotton, sisal or copper .
Democracy must also apply to the international
system. This system is created by the major
economic nations, evidently to suit their priorities
and interests . .
This for instance is particularly the problem in Zambia.
The major problem there has been the fall of the price
I' Africa Confidential, 10 January 1992, Vol 33 No I. ibid.
'7Africa Events, supra. 29. ° Africa Recovers, July-September, 1990, op. cit.: 28.
IS Africa Confidential, 10 January 1992, op. cit.: 1.
of copper on which the country almost solely relied;
secondly the SAP programme and debt repayments
have meant a near-bankrupt country. The triumph of
the MMD has clearly not changed these facts.
Thus as Salim Ahmed Salim rightfully concluded:
while Africa must democratize, our efforts will be
hamstrung by the non-democratic international
economic system in which we operate and which
militates against our development. Logically I
would have thought therefore that an argument for
democratization of African societies would have
been linked to the democratization of the
international system; only such a synergy will work
to pull Africa out of her current economic suffering.2'
This view is further buttressed by the fact that the new
political conditionalities are not meant to increase aid to
Africa but either to retain existing levels22 or reduce
them.23 This view, against the new conditionalities, is
again supported by the fact that 'if democracy cannot
revive Africa's economic fortunes, then it has little
chance of success. No system, democratic or otherwise,
is going to bring peace, harmony or stability unless it is
able to give to its citizens a certain degree of material
well-being.'24 This truth may be illustrated by two
examples. The effectiveness of the Islamic Front (FIS)
in Algeria since the mid- 1 980s, resulting in its electoral
successes of 1990-91 in the local and parliamentary
elections was in large measure a result of increasing
debt and falling oil prices for the Algerian state which
had for long produced enough jobs and services (the
so-called providential state) to satisfy a large portion of
the population.25 Similarly, the Kenyan middle class
generally, though interspersed with individual elements
of resistance and opposition and radical but marginal
voices and organizations like Mwakenya, had
essentially acquiesced to the KANU one-party
dictatorship. As late as April 1991, one commentator
was able to note that, despite some predictions,
President Daniel Arap Moi survived 1990 intact
thanks, inter alia, to:
his control of the army, the indulgence of the British
government, and the existence of a large middle
class, with a vested interest in stability which
surpasses even its dislike for its government
(emphasis added).26
Indeed the selfish behaviour being exhibited by middle
class leaders of FORD in Kenya cannot be a cause for
optimism. Their struggle, which has been mainly for
leadership rather than the strengthening of the
2! ibid.,: 29.
22 S. Decalo, 1992, 'The process, prospects and constraints of
democratization'. African Affairs, Vol 91 No 362: 7-35. See also
Africa Confidential, II January 1991.
"Africa Confidential, 25 October 1991, Vol 32 No 21.
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organization and formulation of programmes, does not
indicate a group of people intent on democratizing a
hitherto, undemocratic polity. A combination of an
undemocratic international system with an
opportunistic 'new breed' leadership should not
deceive anyone into believing that this amounts to a
move towards democracy. So long as the majority of the
people are not involved in and in control of the
definition of the political issues, the political
programmes and the o1itical process likely to take
place represents a mere changing of the guard.
2.3 The popular view
The third view, which is hardly heard but which in our
view objectively represents popular opinion, is that the
struggle for democracy must be essentially a struggle of
the oppressed themselves. The definition of, as well as
the means to attain, this democracy must be left to the
subjects of democracy, namely, the African people.
Democracy must be as comprehensive as possible for
the whole of civil society. One writer who subscribes to
this view has noted that both proponents of one-party
regimes and multi party politics 'begin with a definition
of pluralism so narrow as to negate its social and
ideological dimensions, and limit it to its political
aspect.' He then goes on to say that:
today, this shared premise is boldly upheld in the
simple equation that multiparties mean democracy,
and single party - dictatorship. True, there have
been demands for pluralism that have not been
narrowly political; for example an opposition
demand in Rwanda for an end to state monopoly
over broadcasting media. But these have been few
and scattered. As a rule, the tendency to interpret
democratic pluralism narrowly to mean no more
than party pluralism remains strong in opposition
movements between the Sahara and the Limpopo.27
This characterization of the opposition movement is
generally correct. However, what Professor Mamdani
does not venture to explain is the class character of
these opposition movements and therefore their
equally class-specific definition of democracy. The
reason why on the eve of independence the political
parties had generally been organically separated from
the co-operative (peasant) and trade union (workers')
movements was that the colonial state had nurtured a
middle class or a petty bourgeoisie who would play a
compradorial role for the metropolitan bourgeoisie in
the post-colonial era. It is this petty bourgeoisie that
formed and led the political parties for independence.
Ideologically, the aim of the colonial state was to
24 Africa Confidential, 10 January 1992, op. cit.: 2.
25 R. Mortimer, 1991, 'Islam and multiparty politics in Algeria',Middle
East Journal, Vol 45 No 4, Autumn.
26Afrjca Confidential, 5 April 1991, Vol 32 No 7, p. 2.
27M. Mamdani, supra. p. 9.
prevent the development of left-wing or radical
political organizations, which they dubbed
'communist'.28 However, the petty bourgeoisie that led
the struggle for independence needed the working class
and the peasantry only to oust the colonial regime.
After independence the militancy of the peasants and
more so of the workers was no longer necessary. The
continuation of autonomous trade unions, co-
operatives and a free press was taken to be contrary to
the interests of national unity, peace and the attraction
of foreign finances (public and private). Although the
opposition movements and 'new-breed' middle class
leaders are currently forced to acknowledge the need
for pluralism and autonomous organizations of civil
society - for workers, peasants, women, the
professions, religious groups, etc - they are unlikely, if
voted into power, to tolerate the autonomy and
militancy of these organizations because their interests
are more often than not contradictory to those of these
organizations/classes. Accumulation for a state
bureaucracy or even private capital requires the
exploitation of peasants and workers. Moreover the
continuation of structural adjustment programmes
with their attendant adverse effects on the so-called
vulnerable groups (represented in many cases by these
very organizations of civil society) means that the new
regimes, however democratically elected they may be,
will be forced to unleash the army or the police against
demonstrations, strikes and other forms of protest that
are bound to emanate from civil society. For instance,
even in a fairly well-to-do society like the Ivory Coast,
following recent multiparty elections the Prime
Minister, A. D. Quattara:
has been unwilling to initiate more traumatic cuts
that would be politically suicidal requiring as they
do 'strong [authoritative] governments to sack
public officials or increase consumer food prices
without incurring equivalent óff-setting expenditure
on the military or on repairing riot damage.29
But for how long can this 'unwillingness' continue,
given the demands of the SAP and debt repayment
obligations which mean less and less money available
for social services and long-term development plans?
Most likely not for long. Indeed, as a result of protests
by the affected groups in Africa, programmes for the
so-called alleviation of the social effects of structural
adjustment are being instituted.
More disturbing in the African situation is the fact that,
because of the low level of development of productive
forces, politics is taken to be a job and control of
' On this point for Tanzania for instance see I. G. Shivji, 1986, Law,
State and Working Class in Tanzania, TPH, James Curry, London,
for Uganda see J-J. B. Barya, 1990, Law, State and Working Class
'Organization in Uganda 1962-1987' unpublished PhD thesis,
Warwick University.
29 S. Decalo, supra, p. 34.
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government as the only sure way of making a living or
protecting what is already acquired. The Nigerian
experiments in democracy are quite revealing in this
respect. Although Nigeria is one of the richest African
countries, the view that politics is a job to be won and
kept at all costs is thriving. The most recent and on-
going Babangida experiment in state-managed
democracy clearly shows this point. A government
report in 1989, following the applications by various
organizations for registration as political parties,
pointed out very candidly that the power tussles and
factionalism among these various organizations
betrayed:
a view of politics as a do-or-die battle-field where
stakes are high and where the winner takes all and
the loser loses all. The implications of this view of
politics are so grave that one cannot but discern in it
portents of the destructive consequences of the
politics of intolerance and victimization that
sounded the death knell of our previous experiments
in democratic government.30
Indeed, the recent experience in the Nigerian primaries
for presidential candidates for the two state-created
parties, the Social Democratic Party and National
Republican Convention, underlines the point. The
August 1992 elections within each party were so full of
rigging and other malpractices that they had to be
repeated in September. Therefore, although the
opening up of political space under multiparty politics
(partly as a result of the donors' political conditionalities)
is positive for civil society in Africa, the strengthening
of civil society is not seriously envisaged as part of the
programme of the new democracies, whether by the
donors who are imposing the conditionalities or by
most of the new-breed leaders.
3 WHAT IS TO BE DONE: WHO CAN DO IT?
We have identified five propositions about the
character of and motivation for the new political
conditionalities. We have also looked at three
contradictory interpretations of this new development
and what it means for Africa.
Taking these new conditionalities at face value and
adopting the point of view of finance capital (donors)
will serve no useful purpose for the African peoples.
Indeed, to do so would be simply to aid the project of
finance capital. However, at the same time the point of
view of most of the incumbent regimes mainly that
they are being forced to accept a specific definition of
'° National Electoral Commission, 1989, Report and Recommendations
on Party Formation (Lagos, 1989): 8-9 in O. Oyediran and A. Aghaje,
1991, 'Two partyism and democratic transition in Nigeria' Journal of
Modern African Studies, Vol 29 No 2: 225.
democracy, namely multi partyism - however
enticing it may be, should also be firmly rejected. While
democracy cannot be forced on a people, as we have
consistently argued, the autocratic leadership of Africa
should not be allowed to use independence and the
right of 'self-determination' to lord it over the masses.
But the objection to this must be by the African people
themselves and not any self-appointed 'god-father' or
'new philanthropist'.
There are, in our view, two approaches which should be
combined to enhance the prospects of democracy. The
arguments presented by the OAU and the ECA about
the undemocratic nature of the international economic
system should be taken together with the need to
oppose SAPs and to agitate for the scrapping of Africa's
(or Third World) debts. After all, a lot of the debt
monies did end up in the hands of the dictators, who
were being maintained in power with the support of the
donors who have now 'suddenly seen the light'. 'As a
senior French official observed . . . on 28 February
(1990) in Le Monde, African dictators are in effect
taking French aid money and depositing it in Swiss
Bank accounts or buying Japanese goods with jt.'31
Again in 1990, a senior French official noted in Le
Monde that there was actually no debt crisis in French
Africa since 'the personal fortunes of Africa's élites
outside the continent were greater than the debts of the
countries in question'. In 1988 for instance the Bank of
France had purchased US$ 1.8 billion worth of CFA
banknotes fraudulently transferred to Europe in 'full
suitcases and diplomatic bags'.32 The approach to the
economic problems of Africa must therefore be linked
to the democratic project, because this project is both
social and political. The question of democracy itself
has both economic and socio-political implications at
the international level and at the level of the African
state.
At the level of the nation state what should be
emphasized is the creation or strengthening of
autonomous civil organizations (organizations
autonomous of the state) covering peasants, workers,
women, the informal sector, professional and religious
organizations, etc. The strength of these and probably
their relationship with the different political parties
would determine whether the 'new democracy' being
fought for can be achieved and sustained. The role of
the donors here should be simply to encourage this
situation. The donors should deal with any elected
government. It is the duty of the nationals to struggle
for the best form of government. The definition of
democracy by foreigners will not necessarily coincide
with the definition by civil society and the majority of
the people in the African countries.
"Africa Confidential, 9 March 1990, Vol 31 No 5.
32 Africa Report, January-February 1991: 19 quoted in S. Decalo
op. cit.: 19.
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In this regard it is imperative that autonomous civil
organizations in Africa link up with those in the
developed countries, especially in the major capitalist
countries, to struggle against the international
economic system or, as it is now called by some
scholars, the New International Division of Labour
and Power (NIDLP).33 The policies of the IMF, the
World Bank and Western countries should be actively
opposed by autonomous organizations in the West:
trade unions, women's organizations, the Green and
Environmental movements and other progressive
political organizations or parties. The existing and
emerging civil organizations in Africa should therefore
make links with a selection of these organizations in the
West;' 'a selection' because some of them are pushing
forward the interests of their states and/or finance
capital and not all can be regarded as allies. This is in
fact very important because, with the collapse of
Eastern European state socialism, it has become
untenable for Western states to prop up fascist and
dictatorial regimes with impunity. The smoke screen
that such fascists/dictators were 'bulwarks against
communism' has been removed. Because further
demands to financially support Eastern Europe are
being made on their economies, ordinary people in
Europe now want to know why money is being spent on
a given country. It is at the point of these demands by
civil society in Europe that popular forces and
autonomous civil organizations in Africa should forge
links to ensure that their respective governments are
accountable to them. The possibilities of the success of
this strategy are presaged by the fact for instance that
the World Bank and IMF, following protests against
the structural adjustment programmes, have attempted
to create all sorts of programmes to 'alleviate' the
adverse social effects (so-called social costs) of those
programmes. The new world order that the West is
trying to create is therefore not a foregone conclusion
but will also be shaped by the character and strength of
popular resistance to it.
But how can the multi party system in Africa work?
The multi party system in Africa has, among other
things, at least two major problems. The first one is the
lack of consensus among the middle classes as to the
rules that should govern such a system. We refer to the
middle classes because they are invariably the leaders
and programme formulators of the parties. It is because
(a) the African middle classes are not economically
automomous at the level of the nation-state but
dependent structurally on the Western capitalist
system, and (b) because most of these different political
parties in Africa are tied to particular Western state or
multinational company interests, they are almost
invariably cornered into compradorial roles. The
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second problem is the exclusion of organized civil
society, or worse still its fractionalization along the
divisions among the middle class parties, so that the
effective operation of organized civil society becomes
difficult to sustain. Besides, the compradorial character
of these parties will of course very quickly alienate them
from the majority of the African populace.
It should also be understood that the state of Africa as it
stands today cannot possibly withstand external
pressure on its own. This was hard enough during the
era of the Cold War when the Soviet Union provided
countervailing checks to Western hegemony in the
world. But in a unipolar world, at least for the
foreseeable future, there is no alternative to regional
integration and co-operation. This should become
more meaningful with the liberation of South Africa.
Finally, we point out that it is the obligation of the
organic intellectuals in African countries to identify
and publicize the dangers of the new political
conditionalities and form/join organizations that will
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fight them. But more important is the need for civil
society and organizations autonomous of the state to try
and use the new political space in Africa, now, whatever
its genesis. At the same time, they must resolutely
reject the new compradorial elements which are now
being encouraged by the West or individual countries
like France, the UK or the USA for their political
interests. Some of the new political parties/groups are
popular or at least sections of them represent popular
classes/groups in African society. They should be
identified and alliances made with them. This should
be taken even more seriously in a situation where policy
is still being made and alternative ideologies and
strategies being formulated for the purpose of creating
a new form of legitimacy, with new middle class leaders
replacing discredited dictatorial regimes. Otherwise, to
expect moral transformation of the West and the
Western states in particular and to entrust the
democratization process and demand for rights to them
is an abdication of our own responsibilities for which
we would pay dearly under the new type of hegemony.
We cannot expect other people gratuitously to make
history on our behalf.
